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Over the last ten years, evaluation of legislation has grown into an impor-
tant issue in the Netherlands and in other Member States of the European
Union. Partly due to worries that arose in the Netherlands äs a conse-
quence of excessive regulation and poor legislative quality, there was a
growing need, boosted by quality-of-legislation policies, to assess the effec-
tiveness of statutory regulations in terms of the objectives they pursue. In
actual fact, the enactment of a statutory regulation often is not the termi-
nus of a policy process - contrary to what politicians like to believe - but
only the beginning.
1 LEGISLATION AS A PERPETUAL CYCLE
Only after a regulation has entered into force will it become clear to what
extent the objectives that the regulation meant to achieve are actually
achieved in practice. In itself, using the Instrument of the law to achieve
policy objectives does not guarantee success. Moreover, applying the regu-
lation in practice may have side effects that had not been anticipated by the
legislator in advance. The judge, for instance, may Interpret statutory
regulations in ways that had not been intended by the legislator; executive
organizations may be facing unforeseen overload; Implementation of the
regulation may turn out to be much more costly than expected, etc. Such
effects may arise at any arbitrary moment in the regulation's life cycle. In
the context of Dutch legislative policy, therefore, effective legislation also
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means that the legislator should allow for the social or administrative effects
that statutory regulations may have. Consequences produced by regula-
tions, intended or unintended, may cause a statutory regulation to be
adjusted or withdrawn, or may induce Intervention in the preconditions
that affect a regulation's effectiveness in practice.
All this requires ceaseless attentiveness, which turns the legislative process
into a cyclical activity. The legislator will have to keep his finger on the
pulse and keep collecting Information about the regulation's effect in prac-
tice to determine whether there are any grounds for reevaluating the regu-
lation or any of its elements. Such continuous evaluation and any ensuing
feedback of evaluation results may cause the permanency of a statutory
regulation, and in its wake the stability and the legal certainty involved in
government Intervention through statutory regulations, to suffer. Statu-
tory regulations often benefit from a measure of permanency. To prevent
statutory regulations from having to be revised soon after their entering into
force, legislative partners in the Netherlands (government and parliament)
increasingly tend to agree to evaluate a statutory regulation periodically,
generally after a substantial period of five years; this is the so-called expost
evaluation. They also increasingly attempt to map probable consequences
of a regulation before it enters into force by means of an evaluation in
advance, the so-called ex ante evaluation. This paper deals with both kinds
of legislative evaluation and with their position and role in Dutch legisla-
tive policy.
2 LEGISLATIVE EVALUATION
Collecting Information about the expected or actual effects of a statutory
regulation can be done in many ways. For example, the effects of a regu-
lation can be monitored through the general news outlets. In addition,
interested parties in a statutory regulation, such äs MPs or ministers, fre-
quently set up an ad hoc investigation into any of its aspects. Besides such
rather incidental kinds of evaluation, there are also more systematic kinds
of evaluation. Figures and data on a statutory regulation and developments
in a policy area are often systematically monitored because this has been
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agreed or is required by law. Executive or judicial authorities, for exam-
ple, are obliged to draw up annual reports to show processing or Output
figures, etc. The most systematic kind of legislative evaluation, however,
purposively investigates the effects of a regulation and the significance of
those effects in the perspective of the effects the legislator intended the
regulation to have. This link between actual policy effectiveness and the legis-
lator's intentions turns an evaluation into a genuine legislative evaluation.
Our definition of a legislative evaluation, therefore, is the following: cthe pur-
posive collection and analysis of data on the effect of a statutory regulation
in practice and their assessment in the light of the legislator's intentions'.1
Contrary to other kinds of government effectiveness evaluations, such äs poli-
cy evaluations, the explicit object of the legislative evaluation is the statutory
regulation and the underlying intentions of the legislator. This definition is not
to imply that other kinds of evaluations, such äs policy evaluations,2 may not
be extremely important to the legislator. Statutory regulations are often part
and parcel of an aggregate of policies and policy areas, and policy Informa-
tion about the developments in the field to which the statutory regulation
belongs, therefore, is highly relevant and important to the legislator.3 Infor-
mation about the effect of a regulation that is not directly assessed with ref-
erence to the legislator's intentions may still be of substantial interest. However,
these and other kinds of evaluations will not be discussed in this paper.
3 LEGISLATIVE EVALUATIONS IN ALL SHAPES AND SIZES
There are many ways to evaluate the effects of statutory regulations, and one
of these is the purposive legislative evaluation. Purposive legislative evalua-
tions also come in various shapes and sizes. They are usually subdivided into
ex ante and ex post evaluations: ex ante evaluations are carried out before a
regulation is enacted, and ex post evaluations after a law has come into effect.
1
 See Ph Eijlander, De wet stellen ('Laymg down the law'), Tilburg Umversity dissertation, Zwolle 1993, p 208
2
 This usually means 'judgmg the observed Content, processes, or effects of a policy usmg certam cntena ' For this
definition, see J Th A Bressers, A Hoogerwerf, 'Inleidmg tot de beleidsevaluatie,' m· J Th A Bressers, A Hooger-
werf (eds ) Beleidsevaluatie ('Policy evaluation'), Alphen aan den Rijn 1991, p 21
3
 See, among others, A B Ringelmg, A Sorber (eds ), Macht en onmacht van bestuurhjke evaluaties ('Power and pow-
erlessness of administrative evaluations') 's-Gravenhage 1988
Legislacäo
N.° 33/34 January · June 2003
3.1 Ex ante evaluation
Strictly speaking, ex ante evaluations are not true legislative evaluations in
terms of the definition presented above, since it is impossible to assess in
advance the practical effects of a regulation with reference to the legisla-
tor's intentions. Usually, the legislator's intentions are still incubating, while
the ex ante evaluation is carried out and any practical experience has not
yet been gained. Nevertheless, ex ante evaluations are worth mentioning
here for the role they can play in the deliberate preparation of statutory
regulations. Assessment of the possible pros and cons of an intended statu-
tory regulation will have to be thorough to ensure that a regulation does
not suffer from quality defects that may impede its practical implementa-
tion. Points of special interest for such an ex ante evaluation of intended
statutory regulations can first of all be found in various places in the
Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving ('Instructions for legislation'), a
collection of guidelines that, äs a result of legislative policy initiated in
1992, Dutch legislators must comply with.
1.° INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEGISLATION AND EX ANTE EVALUATION
The Instructions for legislation recommend various types of ex ante
evaluations for aspects related to the (side) effects and other pros and
cons of a regulation. Instruction 9 lays down that, in order to answer
the question whether government action in the form of a statutory regu-
lation is desirable, attention must be paid to the effects and disadvan-
tages caused by a regulation to the government, citizens, companies, and
institutions. Furthermore, the question must be answered to what extent
it is to be expected that a regulation will help to realize the intended
purpose and what side-effects it is likely to have. The Instructions them-
selves present various Instruments for such a preliminary investigation.
The Instructions in Section 2.1, for example, require clarity äs regards
necessity, purpose, and Implementation and maintenance aspects of the
intended regulation, besides consideration of administrative disadvan-
tages on the one hand and disadvantages for citizens, companies, and
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institutions on the other (for a specification, see the explanation added
to Instruction 13). There are other specific Instruments. For example,
Instruction 212 indicates how the effects and disadvantages mentioned
in the explanatory memorandum of a proposed regulation can be budg-
eted and hence be assessed in advance. Instructions 215 and 216 list a
number of points that must be taken into account when budgeting the
financial consequences of a regulation - which, again, is to be expressed
in the explanation.
Besides research on Instructions, there are other Instruments for gaug-
ing the exact effects and side-effects of an intended regulation. A well-
known Instrument to estimate and/or measure the disadvantages and
effects of an intended regulation for companies, institutions, and citizens
in advance is the so-called Bedrijfseffectentoets (BET, 'Company Effects
Test'). This is a checklist that was modernized in 1995, in the framework
of the project entitled Marktwerking, deregulering en wetgevingskwaliteit
(Open market System, deregulation, and quality of legislation'): the MDW
Operation.4
2.° THE BET AND EX ΑΝΤΕ EVALUATION
The Instrument of the BET clearly charts the intended and unintended
consequences of bills for trade and industry, the open market system,
and overall socio-economic development. Its primary purpose is to
promote balanced political decision-making processes. The BET con-
sists of two components, the first of which is a questionnaire which,
in seven key categories, facilitates systematic investigation into the
effects of a bill for trade and industry, the open market System, and
socio-economic development. The BET forces one to make clear: 1)
which categories of companies a bill affects; 2) how many companies
will be confronted with the bill; 3) the nature and the number of the
pros and cons of the regulation (structural effects, financial and com-
pliance effects, uncertainty margins of pros and cons, spread of effects
' De bedrijfseffectentoets (BET), checklist and explanatory memorandum, Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Hague,
June 1995.
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over different companies, administrative costs); 4) how the pros and
cons of a bill relate to the resources of the Company in question; 5) how
things are arranged in a particular policy field in (competing) foreign
countries; 6) what the consequences are for the open market System;
and 7) what the bill's socio-economic consequences are in terms of
employment, production, etc.
3.° SIMULATION OF REGULATIONS, EXPERIMENTS,
AND EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS
One of the more recent forms of ex ante evaluation consists in doing trial
runs with a statutory regulation in a kind of laboratory setting. In such a
setting, the actual context in which a statutory regulation will be operat-
ing after its Implementation is imitated äs accurately äs possible. Such imi-
tation can take the form of a game Simulation or a role play.5 In the recent
past, such experiments have been carried out on the Fertilizer Law.6 A
form of ex ante evaluation that goes a little further is a trial run with a statu-
tory regulation in a field test or an experimental project. In such cases, the
statutory regulation is subjected to an experiment in a real implementation
Situation for some time during its preparatory phase. In such an experi-
mental project, a number of municipalities or a district, for example, exper-
iment for some time with the statutory regulation äs it is expected to be
formulated after its enactment. This may concern an entire regulation or
a component part of the regulation that needs testing. A case in point is
the experimental 'telehearing' project, which was carried out in the Assen
district and concerned Prolongation of the retention on remand procedure
in the framework of the change of the Code of Criminal Procedure.7
5
 A special form of regulation Simulation is micro-simulation, m which, by means of a mathematical model, the con-
sequences of a regulation for different populations is calculated In this type of Simulation, Computer Systems can
play a useful role About this, see J S Svenson, Kennisgebaseerde micro-simulatie ('Knowledge-based micro-simu-
lation'), dissertation TU Twente, Enschede 1993 For a German example of methods and results of simulation-hke
test methods in legislation, see C Bohret, 'Zuerst testen - dann verabschieden Erfahrungen mit der Prüfung von
Gesetzentwürfen', Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung, 1992, pp 193-216
6
 See also the study by Mastik et dl AW 1995 See also D P van den Bosch, 'Simulation of legislation' RegelMaat
1995, pp 202-204
7
 Ka.merstu.kken ('reports on parliamentary proceedmgs') // 1995/96, 24 219, nr 8
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3.2 Ex post evaluation
The best-known form of legislative evaluation is the ex post evaluation, carried
out once a statutory regulation has taken effect. Among ex post evaluations,
too, various distinctions can be made. On the basis of the evaluation method
used, Winter distinguishes two main types of ex post evaluations: systematic
legislative evaluations and subjective evaluations? In a systematic evaluation,
observing and assessing the effects of the statutory regulation are done by
means of scientific research methods. In subjective evaluations, it is not pri-
marily scientific (empirical) methods that are used to investigate and assess the
effects, but other observation methods. A well-known specimen in the latter
category is the short-term legislative evaluation in which an opinion, percep-
tion, or piece of advice is asked of an expert or an authoritative politician with
respect to the effects of a law äs observed by him or her. In their turn, systematic
evaluations can be subdivided into the descriptive-assessing type and the
explanatory-assessing type, the difference between the two being, by and large,
that the former evaluations only take stock of the effects of a statutory regu-
lation in the light of the legislator's intentions, and that the latter also attempt
to specify causes and/or other explanations for the effects observed.
The distinction between these types is important even if only because evalua-
tions can often make a contribution to improving the quality of legislation.
Especially systematic legislative evaluations often yield information, points of
view, or explanations that may lead to adjustments which, on balance, con-
tribute to progress being made on the ladder of legislative quality.9 Other studies
into the influence of legislative evaluation, carried out in the Netherlands, have
also shown that systematic legislative evaluations, especially if implemented by
bodies outside the circle of those immediately involved in the regulation, can
often make a positive contribution to the quality of legislation. It should cause
no surprise, therefore, that Dutch legislative policy, which is founded on the
memorandum Zieht op wetgevmg ('View of legislation'),10 greatly values regu-
lär and systematic legislative evaluations. This, incidentally, in no way disquali-
8
 Cf H B Winter, Lvaluatie in het wetgevingsforum ('Evaluation in the legislative forum'), dissertation Groningen
Umversity, Deventer 1996, pp 59 & ff
' See Winter, a w 1996, p 326
10
 See Kamerstukken II 1990/91,22 008, nrs 1-2, pp 39-40
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fies other forms of legislative evaluation, which can also make a quality con-
tribution in other circumstances or may be indicated on other grounds.
4 THE RELATION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE EVALUATION
AND LEGISLATIVE QUALITY
In the Netherlands, a good deal of research has been conducted into the rela-
tion between legislative evaluation and the quality of legislation. For exam-
ple, in his dissertation entitled Evaluatie in het wetgevmgsforum ('Evaluation
in the legislative forum', 1996), Winter developed the model of the legislative
forum with a special eye to measuring the effects of legislative evaluation.
This model is interesting for legislators for more reasons than legislative
evaluation alone. This model of the legislative forum takes in everyone involved
in the development and realization of legislation, and the central idea behind
it is that the quality of the arguments determines the quality of the debate in
the forum11, and that, in turn, the quality of the debate in the forum deter-
mines the quality of the legislation. By better, i.e., more empirically founded,
Information, the quality of legislation can be improved. A precondition for
this assumption is that it is also assumed that more rational arguments and
considerations lead to better decisions, insights, etc. However - and this is also
recognized in a growing number of administrative publications12 -, the actual
legislative process is not always äs simple äs that. Debate in the legislative
forum is not entirely dictated by the laws of rational exchange of arguments
and a search for higher quality of Information and argumentation. The dis-
cussion in the legislative forum is increasingly target-searching rather than tar-
get-determining in nature.13 In our view, the debate in the legislative forum
mostly does not obey the laws of rational consideration and policy-making.
The issues and the finality of such a debate - perhaps even more than those
11
 In this context, this means that the more empmcal the foundation of the argument, the better its quality
12
 See the cnticism of rational pohcy makmg methods by, among others, I Th M Snellen, Bauend en geboetd ('Capti-
vatmg and captivated'), maugural lecture Tilburg Umversity, Tilburg 1987, but also Hoogerwerf himself relativizes the
value of rational pohcy making and Objective' Information äs a basis for the effectiveness and legitimacy of pohcy, see
A Hoogerwerf, 'Hct ontwerpcn van beleid als wetenschapstoepassing' ('Designmg pohcy äs an application of science'),
in A Hoogerwerf (ed ), Het ontwerpen van beleid ('Desigmng policy"), Alphen aan den Rijn 1992, pp 17 6t ff
13
 See Ph Eijlander et al (eds ), Wetgeven en de maat van de Ujd ('Legislatmg and the measure of time'), Zwolle 1994,
pp 10-11
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of administrative policy-making - are strongly determined by other ratio-
nalities, such äs the political, socio-economic, and judicial ones.14
5 MOTIVES FOR LEGISLATIVE EVALUATION
Evaluation of a statutory regulation can be advisable for various reasons. A
first, and possibly the most important motive, is that the legislator wishes to
know which effects a statutory regulation has in practice. If there turn out to
be any bottlenecks in practice, the regulation may then be adjusted, which will
help to improve the quality of the regulation or its implementation and
enforcement. Another motive is often prompted by the political dimension
of the legislative process, which also plays a role in the decision whether to
evaluate a statutory regulation or not. If an evaluation has been indicated or
stipulated in a legislative proposal, this may often accelerate political deci-
sion-making, äs any lacking consensus about the proposal is counterbalanced
by the promise of an evaluation.15 In this way, an evaluation that has been indi-
cated or stipulated in a statutory regulation may act äs a lubncant in the pro-
cess leading up to a law's enactment.16 Following naturally from this function,
legislative evaluation can also be used strategically, by parliamentary minori-
ties in particular, to reintroduce sensitive issues periodically on the political
agenda. The practice of legislative evaluation research demonstrates that legis-
lative evaluation research is likely to be less effective if the decision-making
context is more discordant.17 Nevertheless, the power of legislative evaluation
äs a Strategie political Instrument should not be underestimated.
Besides motives and functions, legislative evaluations may also have a legiti-
mizing function: a legislative evaluation may help to engender public sup-
port for a regulation äs it provides an opportunity to give vent to objections
or criticism etc. Legislative evaluation may contribute to the communicative
potential of statutory regulations, äs discussed previously in this book. Legis-
" Cf Wim Voermans (review), H Winter, 'Evaluaties m het wetgevingsforum', Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis
1998, volume 159, pp 26 29
15
 See also J M Polak, Over de herkomst en resultaten van opdi achten voor wetsevaluaties', m J H T H Andnessen
et αϊ, Wetsevalitaties tussen wetenschap en beleia ('Legislative evaluations between science and policy')
" See Eijlander, op cit, 1993, p 208
1?
 H B Winter, M Scheltema, M Herweijer, Evaluatie van wetgevmg terugbhk en perspectief ('Legislative evalua
tion retrospcctive and perspective'), Deventer 1990, p 192
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lative evaluation research can also have a warning function. By including an
evaluation stipulation in a statutory regulation, for instance, parliament can
signal that it has only accepted the bill nolens volens. In a more positive
sense, the legislator can also seize the evaluation to indicate that the effects
the statutory regulation will in practice have his füll his care and attention.
6 EVALUATIONS: WHEN, HOW, AND BY MEANS OF WHICH CRITERIA?
Evaluations are costly and time-consuming. This is why it is not always
opportune to announce and implement extensive evaluations of each and
every statutory regulation. Moreover, extensive, systematic evaluations
do not always generate results that are effective: many of the effects that
are investigated and the explanations that are found for them will not lead
to adjustment or reconsideration of legislation.18 In general, evaluations
rarely lead to fundamental adjustment of established legislation,19 though
research results do frequently lead to Solutions for problems in actual
Implementation practice.20 Nor should we forget that evaluations, especially
ex post evaluations, also involve risks. Promising an evaluation, for
example, may signify that a problem that should really have been dealt
with when the regulation was being prepared is actually shelved. Evalua-
tions can also be seized to reintroduce debates on statutory regulations.21
The stability of legislation does not always benefit from periodic imple-
mentation of evaluations. Premature evaluations, that is, following immedi-
ately upon the enforcement of the statutory regulation, are often inefficient
because Implementation practice has not yet taken shape, little experience
" The Dutch Audit Office, for mstance, concluded that the usefulness of evaluation facilities is actually doubted by
legislative departments themselves There are other ways of obtammg Information about the effects of statutory reg-
ulations contacts with branches in Society and executive and enforcement agencies, Consulting case law or appeals
lodged äs a consequence of a statutory regulation See Algemene Rekenkamer, Wetgevmg orgamsatie, proces en pro-
dukt ('Legislation orgamzation, process and product'), Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 710, nrs l 2, p 20
19
 Rmgelmg holds that people's expectation that evaluation will always lead to sweepmg changes or improvements
m policy is an overestimation of its significance, if not a rather mechamstic view of evaluation This does not mean
that evaluations m general have httle or no mfluence on policy, but that the results of evaluation studies are only
one kmd of mput m the legislative process, not the only mput and certamly not the most authontative See A
Rmgelmg, 'Wetsevaluatie' ('Legislative evaluation'), RegelMaat 1995, p 49-56
20
 See Winter et al, op cit 1990,222-223
21
 See also H B Winter, Het forummodel en de toekomst van evaluatie van wetgevmg ('The forum model and the
future of legislative evaluation'), 1997, p 137-138
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with the regulation has been gained, and the debate about its content is
still very fresh.
If the legislator decides that an evaluation is imperative, he will have to proceed
selectively.22 If a new regulation carries great social weight, for instance, and
the effects of the regulation are hard to map in advance, there will usually be
a direct and necessary ground for making a periodic evaluation mandatory
by way of an evaluation stipulation in a statutory regulation. Also in cases of
modular legislation (i.e., in subsequent phases or tranches), systematic evalua-
tion is important. Implementation experiences gained in previous phases can
then be used to generate learning effects for subsequent phases.
In many other cases, an extensive systematic evaluation must be consid-
ered äs a subsidiary instrument: there is only scope for such an extensive
systematic evaluation if the possibilities to assess the possible practical
effects of a statutory regulation by way of preliminary inquiry are inade-
quate for a reliable preview, or if there are no other simple ways to use
existing sources of Information to collect Information about the law's effect.
In the long term, selective use of systematic legislative evaluation prevents
this mechanism from becoming a meaningless ritual due to overexposure.23
Evaluation of legislation, however, does remain very important. Continuous
Information about the effect of statutory regulations is even gaining
importance. In order to obtain sufficient evaluation data, it is important for
the legislator to arrange effectively and efficiently which Information is to
reach whom in which way. Effective ways of collecting Information include
legal commitments for executive organizations to present figures, reports,
or other Information to the minister responsible for implementing the regu-
lation. By stipulating that third parties should also be acquainted with such
Information, several actors involved in the legislative process can keep up
to date with the practical effects of a statutory regulation. Especially if
tasks are delegated to independent administrative bodies that do not come
within the compass of ministerial responsibility, it is important to ade-
quately arrange the Information flows in the regulation System, both from
the evaluative point of view and from the perspective of possible public
22
 See also Winter, op cit 1996, p 327 ff
23
 See also Manette Lokin, Evaluatie van wetgevmg. van praktrjk naar beleid ('Legislative evaluation from practice
to pohoy'), RegelMdut 1997, p.131 ff
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control.
Particularly if statutory regulations have a provisional or experimental
character, evaluation is the appropriate way of monitoring whether the
regulation will acquire a measure of stability.
7 EVALUATION CRITERIA
In the Netherlands, legislative evaluation may have several foundations.
They may arise from a legal Obligation to carry out a legislative evaluation.
They may also result from a governmental or ministerial undertaking laid
down either in a regulation's explanatory memorandum or elsewhere in the
legislative process. If a legislative evaluation is being contemplated, whether
in a statutory regulation or elsewhere, it is imperative to make the frame-
work of the evaluation unequivocally clear, especially the criteria that will
be used to assess the regulation. This prevents the evaluation research from
going astray or the results from being irrelevant in retrospect. To make
sure that a legislative evaluation is a meaningful enterprise that can nourish
a debate on experiences with a statutory regulation on the basis of
empirically substantiated data and arguments, several matters must be
observed in Dutch legislative policy.
First of all, those who commission the evaluation need to be well set-up.
This means that the evaluative parameters need to be precisely defined and
that the commissioning authority needs to specify accurately what kind of
Information the evaluation is supposed to provide: is it supposed to be a
broad systematic study that compares empirical data with the legislator's
objectives, or is it to be quick advice on bottlenecks occurring in practice
during the Implementation of the statutory regulation? In the former case,
a systematic legislative evaluation is in order; in the latter case, a more con-
sultancy-like approach may do, to be carried out by an expert or consul-
tant.
The commissioning authority also needs to keep a close eye on the quality
of the evaluation study that is being carried out. High-quality evalua-
tion studies guarantee that the significance and value of future legislative
evaluation will not wear away. The most important garantees of quality
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in this respect include quality control of the research itself and an ade-
quate infrastructure for monitoring and process control during the evalua-
tion study. Quality control of the research itself means that the
commissioning authority should make sure that the study has a clear
problem definition, that the evaluation criteria have been critically exam-
ined, that the proper research method is used to guarantee the scientific
quality of the study, that the results of the evaluation study have been
tested, etc. The Dutch researcher Winter has demonstrated that it is not
uncommon for legislative evaluation studies to have a flawed quality con-
trol System. For instance, the symmetry requirement, which stipulates
that a study should not present any conclusions or recommendations
that do not ensue from the analytical findings, is frequently violated.24
Commissioning authorities need to develop an evaluation policy that
specifies criteria and norms for evaluation studies to meet. Such a policy
is commonly lacking.25
Arrangements concerning the infrastructure can also help to boost the
quality of legislative evaluation. Naturally, the commissioning authority
should make solid agreements about the expenses, duration, and design of
the study. If a commissioning authority is itself the main executor of the
study, through its research department, for example, it is also important
to make solid arrangements with those involved. For a variety of reasons,
evaluation studies have a tendency to overstep time limits, which may
involve major drawbacks äs the usefulness of the study's Information is
often dependent on the moment it is made available. Time management
implies that the commissioning authority should play an active role in
collecting the data that are required for the study. Loss of time is often
caused by situations in which parties bide their time. Taking charge of
the study-in-progress includes the establishment of a supervisory com-
mittee. Such a supervisory committee can keep a close watch on the quality
of the study's content and can function äs the commissioning authority's
counterpart. After the evaluation data have become available, the
commissioning authority must ensure that the research results land on
!4
 See Winter, op cit 1996, p 330 ff
35
 Winter recommends mvolving the Interdepartmental Commission for the Harmonization of Legislation See Win-
ter loc cit 1997, p 139
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the appropriate desks rather than end up in its own bottom drawer. This
may require an active effort from the commissioning authority to make
sure the research data are widely disseminated or distributed on a more
limited and confidential scale.
ANNEX
Ev^lUation of legislation in the Netherlands
Business Effects Test
CheckSist and Notes
EFFECTS OF DRAFT LEGISLATION
Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Netherlands
BET Checklist
Points for attention in the testing of draft legislation
for effects on businesses
The Hague - September 1995
POREWORD
General
Thi,s brochure contains the Dutch Business Effects Test (BET) Check-
list; a list of seven points requiring attention when the impact of draft
legislation on businesses is assessed. The Checklist and the accompa-
nying Notes are intended äs an aid for those conducting the BET. This
Checklist forms part of the Questionnaire for the testing of draft leg-
islation, äs used by the inter-departmental Proposed Legislation Work-
ing Group (Gouvernment Gazette 1995, No. 96), The Questionnaire
includes questions on whether legislation is irnplementable and enforce-
äble, and on its effects on the environment. The füll Questionnaire is
presented in Appendix 6. A brochure has also been prodüced on the
other aspects.
The BET is an Instrument designed to clearly identify the intended and
unintended consequences of draft legislation for businesses, the function-
ing of mafkets and social and economic development. Its primary purpose
is to facilitate balanced political decision-making, A descriptiori of effects
on businesses forms ä compulsory part of the Notes accompanying draft
legislation with potential business effects.
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Formal Integration ofthe B ET
The BET forms part of the Instractions for Legislation' (Gouvernment
Gazette 1992, No. 230), These instructions tepresent an important ai4 in
the realisation of effective legislation.
The Dutch government also approved the Market Functionj De.r'egulation
and Quality of Legislatiori (MDQ) project oft 4 November 1994, The aims
of this Operation are improved legisiation,, a more dynamie economy and
more effective administration. An important part of the project was the
installatioa of a Miftisterial Commission for Market F^nction, Deregula-
tioa and Quality of Legislation, chaired by the Prime Minister (Gouvern-
nient Gazette 1995, No. 15), This Commission not only reviews existing
legislation, but also considers draft legislation separately, As a result, the
BET falls under the Commission's responsibiliity,, together wkh the tests
for implementability and enforceability of the Ministry of Justice, and the
environmental irnpact test of the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning
and the Environment.
The inter-departmental Proposed Legislation Working Group was formed
äs part of the MDQ project. Its mandate is to list proposed legislation at
central government leyel and, where relevant, to determine the extent to
which the department with prime responsibility for the legislation in ques-
tion should provide an insight into the potential (side) effects.
BUSINESS EFFECTS
Business effects form part of the (side) effeots of legislation and regula-
tions,
The term 'business effects' refers to costs and benefits for busines^es or
business categories, consequences for the functiornng of markets and social
and ecottomic effects, Costs and benefits can include financial effects (tax-
ation, duties, compensation for darnages etc.) and compliance effects
(administrative costs, caplt^l costs, loss of earnings, savings etc.),
Among other things, the functioning of markets relat^s to the possibilities
for riew businesses to penetrate the market.
' ivaluatjon of legislatton m the Netherlands
Social and economic effects can involve the consequences for production,
employment and Investment, Information oa the approach taken by other
eountries in the field to which the draft legislation relates is important in
the determlnation of the social and economic effects. The foreign test is
theref ore a separate point for consideration in the BET Checklist,
CHECKLIST
The Ministry of Economic Äff airs drew up the BET Checklist primarily in
order to give the BET form and content, ön the basis of this Checklist, the
Proposed Legislation Working <5roup determines the extent to which the
various legislative proposals should be subjected to the BET, in consulta-
tjon with the department holding primary responsibility for the draft leg-
isktion in qwestion. The significance and nature of the draft legislation are
important in this yespect.
The Checklist also helps to ensure that, äs far äs possible, the <same issnes
äre tfeated in similar ways in draft legislation. This is not only a question
of staQ(iardisatio% but also one of providing the government and Parlia-
rnent with an insight into the potential (side) effects of draft legislation on
a more systematic basis than in the past
The Checklist is accompänied by detailed explanatory Notes. These explain
the significance of each point, whiph aspects afe important, the meaning of
the terms used and means of obtaining Information. The Notes also con-
tain various tips, examples and güidelines.
Stfucture of the brochure
The brochure star|s with a general Information section on the BET. Among
othey things, this explains which legislation should be assössed, when and how
this shotild be done, how to deal with Büropean Community (EC) legisla-
tipn and which Services the Ministry of Economic Affairs can offer, The
general section is followed by the BET Checklist itself. Finally, the brochure
individüai explanations of each of the seven points in Checklist.
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fÜRTHER INFORMATION
The Business Effects Test Secretariat of the Ministry of Bconornip Affairs
can atways offer assistance and further informatiort oü the Implementa-
tion of the BET.
This Secretariat forms part of the Joint Support Centre for Proposed Leg-
islation. The support centre was forraed at the initiative of the Ministries
of Justice, of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, and of
Economic Affairs. Comments5 additions» corrections and tips which could
improve or clarify a later edition of this brochure äre welcomed,
G. J. Wijers
Minister of Economii; Affatrs
Evaluatiort of legislation in the Neth^rlands
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1, OENERALINFORMATION
cm the Business effects test
Wbat f$ the businqss effects test?
The Business effects test (BRT) is an Instrument designed to clearly iden>
tify the intended and, more inipojrtantly, the unintended effects of draft
legislation on businesses, the functionittg of markets and on söcial and eco-
nomic development.
The description of these intended and uniiiteiided coa$eqttences is a com·^
pulsory part of the Notes accompany diaft legislation with poteiitial effetits
on businesses.
Exaraple
Coaseqüences for busioesses can include:
* Financial rights or comiaitöients in relaticin to the government
* Necessary Investment (in plant, eqtupment etc.,)
« Higher or lower administrative costs
* Changes in the scale of production and employment
* Restriction of, or an increase in competition.
In order to promote transparenoy, yott are advised to provide th^ descrip-
tioa of these coixsequences in a separate patä^raph.
Reasorisfor the bunness effects test
The primary aim of legislation and regulation is to generate positive söcial
effects. iiöwever, in nuny cases legislation also has (side) effeets, the scale aöd
nature of which are not clear in advance, Thes6 (side) effects can He in'the ar«a
of compliance costs for businesses, for exarnple? or in consequences for com-
petition, econoniic dynamism., employment, the environment or safety, Leg-
islatioii can therefore unintentionally underniine the main aJynqwi pf the policy.
An insight into all Relevant (side) effects is essential for a balanced a^sess-
ment of, anxl decision-making on dr^ft legislation (^hether the legislation
Eyaluatiort of legislätion in the Netherlands
is implementable, enforceable, and has consequenees for businesses and
the environment). After all* only then is it possible to form a view on the
proportionality of the legislation, or its cost-benefit ratio. All Notes to
draft legislation therefote include an outline of the nature and scale of the
intended an4 tminteftded öffects. The BET represents an aid to the prepa^
ration of such an outline,
The BET is consequently in line with the Cabinet's plans to reallocate
fesponsibilities, According to the Coalition Accord, such a reallocation
can leäd to a new balance between the need for protection and the need
for economic dynamics,
To this end, the goverament introduced the Market Punction, Deregula-
tion and Quality of Legislation (MDQ) Operation, The aims are to reduce
the bürden of administrative costs aftd regulation for business to the min-
iniüm necessary, to reinforce the functioning of ntarkets and to inipfove
the quality of legislation and regulation.
In order to realise thesfe goals, the Cabinet toust not only reassess existing
legislätion in terjns of aspects such äs neuessity, whether the means justify
the eiids and enforceability, but also wants to realise more stringent test-
ing of proposed legislation, After all, there will be little benefit in improv-
ing existing legislation if government departments at the same time are
producjng new legislation With disproportionate side effects.
When is testing required?
Ί
It is extteniely important that the BET is performed at the earliest possi-
1>le stage, It is precisely in the phases where a choice between Instruments
and between alternative forms of regulation is still jpossible that the BUT
will gonerate the most yaluable results, This applies not only for legisla-
tion, but also fot policy papers or speciäl regulations laying down a (future)
legal frameWorfc.
This need not lead to delays iß the legislative process, After all, you will
reoeive requests for Information on the consequenees for businesses any-
way, in the couise of interdepartmental talks, from the Cabinet, from the
Council of State or from Parliament. It will be easier to provide the required
Information and eliminate any resistance among the businesses concerned,
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or in political circles, if you take these questiqns into aceount from the
start. This can avoid considerable delays,
Which legtslation should be assesstid?
The Instractions for Legislatioa, of which the BIT forms a part, relate to
all forms of legislation and regulation which are realised under Ministerial
responsibility, This not only includes Acts of Parliament, but also General
Administrative Orders (AMvBs), and Ministerial Decrees and Orders, The
(side) effects, including those for bxisinesses, shottld therefore be consid-
ered in the preparatory stages of all these forfns of legislation and regula-
tion (see Instructions 9 and 13 in Appendix 3 of this brochure),
The inter-departmental Proposed Legislation Working Group, which
works under the flag of the MDQ Operation, draws up a list of all planned
central government legislation and regulations with (side) effects for busi-
nesses, the environment and for implementability and enforceability. The
working group will also state which (side) effects of the draft legislation
rrmst in any event be described by the department initiafing the legisla-
tion. This results in the 'Legislative Review', Obviously, the BIT only
plays a role in draft legislation with potential eonsequences for busi*
nesses, It need not, therefore, be performed fot every piece of draft leg-
islation,
Example
Draft legislation to which the BET has been or will be applied:
* Regulating ecotax for small-scale consuniers
* The new Competition Act,
Draft legislation for which no BET is required:
* Privatisation of the General Civil Service Pension Fund (ABP)
• The Delta Act for Major Rivers (legislation on emergency fortification
of dikes).
Evaluation of legislation m the Netherlands
Tfye formal procedure for the legislative tests by the Ministry of Justice does
not apply for Ministerial Orders and Decrees, äs these are not debated by
the Cabinet. Nevertheless, a description of the business effects is required
in the Notes for these forms of regulation (see Instruction 212). It is there-
fore important that the departments most closely involved also consult
each other on Ministerial regulations. Again, the BET Checklist can be used
for this purpose. If the business effects have already been discüssed in the
Notes to the underlying regulation or Act, a reference to these Notes will
usually suffice.
A great deal of draft legislation is based on EG legislation. At least 30% of
Dutch legislation and regulation now derives directly or indirectly from
Brüssels, This is why business effects should be considered both in the
preparatiorx of EC legislation and in its Implementation. However, testiflg
need not be carried out if the underlying EC Directive, in terms of both
norms a,ad application, leaves no policy scope for Implementation in
national legislation.
Finälly, it should the noted that if draft legislation with consequences for
businesses is altered substantially düring the formulation process (for exam-
ple äs a result pf advice from the Council of State or comments from the
Second Chamber of Parliament), re-testing may be necessary,
How shottld testtng be performed?
It is certainly not necessary to cover every point on the BET Check-
list in detail, with quantifications, for every piece of draft legislation,
In most cases, ä brief BET will suffice. The primary issues in this case
are indications of the scale of the main business effects (to be expected).
A detailed quantitative analysis of the social and econoraic effects is not
required here. Generally speaking, the more extensive the expected
effects on businesses and on social and economic developments, the
more stringent the testing requirements will be. In this case, we refer
to a 'detajled' BET, It may then be necessary to employ an external
agency to collect the data you need for the BET. The Checklist then
serves äs a useful aid to the realisation of a satisfactory research assign-
ment.
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and the knowledge aad experlence atailable at the Miaistry of Economic
Affairs in the fielet of identifying Business effects,
2. BET CHECKLIST
The (side) effects of draft legislation are äs, sessed oa the basis of the ques-
tioanaire iised by the Proposed Legislation workiag group (see Appendix
6). The BET Checklist, "which forrtis part of this questionuairö, pöfttaim
the follöwing seven poiats fot* consideraüon. in the testing of draft legisla4·
tion for its impact on businesses;
1» For which categories of busjness could the draft legislätion produce
business effects?
2* How many businesses are actüally involted?
3. What is the most likely »ature and scale of the dosts and beöefits of the
draft iegislatäon for the busiaesses concemed?
The Hotes should cover;
Λ) Whether the effects are structural or ocpur oace oftly,
b} The split between finandal aad corapliaaee effects.
c) The evidence fof the costs aad beaefits, and the xiacertaiiity maygins,
£5?) The balance in the distribution of the effects araoag (categories of) busi-
aesses.
e) The consequences for the scale of administrative costs»
4. How do the costs and benefits of the draft legislation corapare wi,th, the
resources of the btisinesses ia questioa?
ι
i, What is the positioa regardulg legislatioa in the relevant policy field in
the couatiies that can be regarded a$ the most Wportant competitors of
the Datch busiaesses in questiofi? (poreign test)
pvaluatiort of togislatiorj m tfie Netherlands
PIVISIÖN OB ROLES
Goverament departmeats themselves hold primary responsibility for the
<juaiity of their draft legislatioa. The saaie applies for the explaaatioa and
testiag of the (side) effects associated with the legislatioa in questioa.
The1 Miaistry of Justice holds primary responsibility for the general leg-
islative te$t
Öa the basis of the Legislative Reviewj this Miaistry will pjreseat iegisla-
tioa* with potential effects for businesses to the JVlinistry of Economic
Thö Mirjistry of Jüstice^ the Miilistry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of
Housing, l%ysical Planning aad the Environment aijd, if rxecessary, öther
departaeftls will assess t}ie informative value of the sections, of the Notes
fo the draft legislation whieh are relevant to theta. The key issue here is
whether the Cabinet and Parliamettt can ir^ priüqiple naake a balanced
assessnieiat of irjterests on the basi$ of the inforniation provided in the
Notes. Öbvkmsly, eadb, depa^tment also has it$ owa responsibility to assess
the cost^beaefit ratio of dfaft kgislation. In many casesj this assessment will
leacj to an advisory fepott to the Ministers concerne4s for the pttfpose of
the Cabinet discussioas on the prop^ose^i legislatioa.
SERVICE PROVISION BY THJE MlNISTEY Of ECOiSTOMIC AFFAIRS
It is not älways/ easy to provide a clear insight iato the (side) effects of
draft Iegi4ation. The Miaistry of Housing, Physical Planniag and the Eavi-
röjjiment» the Ministry of J^stice aad the Ministry of Economic Affairs
therefojre decidod to provide jpint inforaiation aad assistance for the
description of the (side) effeöts of draft legislatioa. The Joiat Support Cea-
tre for Proposed Legislation has secrÄari^ts for the BIT and for the envi-
lOameatal jimpact test. The Legislation Dir^ctorate (Legislative QuaHty
Policy seetor) at the, Ministry of Justiee provides support, In exceptional
casös, the Support Point caa provide finaacial assistaace for external
r/es^arch. You caa also contait the BEf liaison officer in your own depart-
^see Appe;adix 5). MoreOVer, yoU can njake use of the BBT databaak
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6, What are the consequences of the draft legislation for market opera-
tions?
7. What are the social and economie effects öf the draft legislation (pn
employment, productioa etc.)?
3, NOTES TO THE BET CBJECKLIST
Purpose ofthe Checklist
The Checklist was drawn up in order to make the description of the busi-
ness effects of draft legislation, or the Implementation of the BET, concrete.
Again, we recommend that the Checkiist is not applied to legislation that
is virtually firjalised, but at the earliest possible stage of the legislative prO-
cess, The Checklist can prove its worth precisely at the stage when alter-
natives for the legislation are being considered.
Which questions?
One of the tasks of the Interdepartmental Proposed Legislation working
group is to provide a concrete Statement in the Legislative Review of the
exteat to which the BET (including the foreign test) shoüld be performed.
The points for attention in the list are, in outline:
* A description of the natwre and scale öf the costs and benefits for busi-
nesses (Qüestions l to 3);
* Relating these costs and benefits to the capacity of the businesses con-
eerned (Question 4);
β A description of the Situation in the relevant field of legislation in other
countries (Question 5);
• A statement of the consequences for the functioning of markets (Ques-
tion 6);
• A description of the social and economic effects (Question 7).
Evaluattcm of legislation m the Nethertands
Depending on tlie nature, significance and scope of the draft legislation, the
working group will detertnine, in consultation with the departtnent hold-
ing prirnary responsibility, which Information is desirable or essential in the
Notes in order to provide the required insight.
Quantificatton
Generally speakittg, it is desirable to quantify the effects of draft legisla-
tion on businesses äs far äs possible (see Instruction 212), The degree of
qUantification required varies from one point to another. For example, the
reply to Point 6 will almost always be made in qualitative tertns, while
this is iaapossible for Point 2.
The required degree of quantification also depends on the nature, signifi-
cance and scope of the draft legislation and the availability of data. The pos-
sibilities for quantifying the effects on businesses will be considered on a
case by case basis by the officials handling the dossiers in the department
concerned, in consultation with the Joint Support Centre fof Proposed
Legislatioa,
Structure
The points for attention are explained in more detail, in sequence, in the
rernainder of these Notes.
The clarification of each point is structured äs follows:
« The significance of the point
* Definition of the terms used
* Method of reply
* Possible sources of Information,
